The same sale. Different rewards.

A hypothetical flat commission of 2%.

+$20,000
Extra sale price achieved
Seller’s extra proceeds
$19,60098% · after the extra commission
Extra gross commission
$4002% · before splits and costs
The extra effort produces different financial rewards for each party. This illustrates an incentive gap, not proof of poor conduct. Taxes and other costs are excluded.

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Look for the Incentive

Andrew Peter Allen · October 2026 · 3 min read

When someone’s behaviour makes no sense, look at what it makes sense for them to do. What gets them paid? What helps them avoid trouble? What makes them look competent to the person judging their work? The answer may explain more than their stated objective.

A note in my wisdom bank puts it bluntly: “The universe is optimized for incentives and not outcomes.” Taken literally, that is too sweeping. As a way of examining human systems, though, it asks a useful question: are we rewarding the behaviour that would produce the result we say we want?

The example attached to the card is selling a house. A seller wants the best achievable outcome. An agent also wants a sale, but the timing, certainty and extra work involved may matter differently to each of them. Their interests overlap without being identical.

Consider a purely hypothetical flat commission of two per cent. An extra $20,000 in the sale price produces another $400 in commission before any splits or costs. The seller’s financial gain is much larger. If achieving that extra amount requires substantial effort and introduces a risk that the sale falls through, the two parties may judge the trade-off differently.

That arithmetic does not prove that an agent will behave badly. Reputation, professional standards, repeat business and personal pride can all support excellent work. It does show why a shared desire to complete a transaction is not enough to establish that every decision along the way serves both parties equally.

The same question is useful inside a business. If you reward the number of calls made, you may get more calls. Whether you get better conversations or more satisfied customers is a separate question. People can meet the measure while missing the purpose, especially when the measure determines their reward.

The response is to examine the arrangement. What is being counted? Who receives the benefit? Who bears the cost of a mistake? What sensible behaviour becomes difficult under the present rules? These questions are more useful than simply demanding that people care more.

Turn the lens on yourself as well. If clearing your inbox produces an immediate feeling of achievement while important work produces uncertainty, you have a small incentive system of your own. It helps explain why the inbox can win even when you know the other work matters more.

Incentives are a lens, not a complete theory of people. Loyalty, generosity, habit and judgment still matter. But before assuming that a disappointing outcome came from stupidity or bad character, inspect what the situation encouraged. You may find that the behaviour was predictable, and that changing the arrangement would work better than repeating the complaint.

Developed from my 2017 note, “Optimized for incentives”, and its comments about property sales and human behaviour. The commission example is illustrative.

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